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Abstract
This paper investigates possible options for generating revenue in international unions. 
The empirical evidence is found for three types of revenue-generating schemes: 
contributions, direct taxes, and the combination of two. Discussion of peculiarities, 
advantages and shortcomings of each scheme led to the conclusion that financial 
needs, interstate heterogeneity, objectives and success of integration are the key factors 
determining the choice of a revenue-generating scheme. There is no clear pattern in 
the distribution of the schemes among different international unions. However, mixed 
scheme becomes more preferable to ensure sustainable financing international unions.
Also, direct tax scheme would be the infant stage of a tax union that had no precedent in 
the modern history of economic integration. 
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I. Introduction
Since the Second World War, international integration has boosted immensely in 
terms of both geographic and sectoral coverage. There is hardly a country that is not 
involved in this process today. These arguments make every type of international union, 
ranging from free trade areas to monetary and economic unions, intriguing subject.1 
This is especially true when it comes the issue of financing mechanisms of the unions 
that remains little explored.
There is also a practical need in filling for theoretical vacuum which exists around 
the issues of revenue-generating in international organizations, since financial stability 
is one of the main factors for successful operation of any international organization. 
The issues are quite interesting even from the purely cognitive point of view. There 
may exist peculiar features, in the supranational budgeting process, being different from 
national or subnational budgeting. 
Budgetary issues of the European Union, are provided with the theory of fiscal 
federalism in Alesina et al. (2005), Buti and Nava (2003), Tabellini (2003), behavioural 
budgeting theory Hoole et al. (1976), national costs and benefits theory in Carruba 
(1997), Hix (1999) the efficiency of centralized fiscal spending in international unions 
is estimated in Simon and Valasek (2012). 
Still the lack of exploration remains an issue of theoretical foundations for revenue-
generating in international unions. Even in the classical economic integration literature, 
it is omitted (Viner 1950, Meade 1955, Balassa 1961, Tinbergen 1965). However, 
addressing these questions could help the unions to find ways to increase their 
efficiency and sustainability. 
Thus, this article pursues objectives to synthesize theoretical models of revenue-
generating in international unions to discuss factors determining selection of a particular 
scheme. The study will generate more impulse for further developments in this area. 
The investigation is primarily based on empirical data retrieved from official 
documentation of 23 international unions.2 An overview of revenue sides in budgets 
1 International union in this study is regarded as a voluntary association of sovereign states that decide to centralize or coordinate 
certain policies and confer corresponding powers to central supranational bodies.
2 Namely the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
the East African Community (EAC), the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Economic and Monetary Community 
of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Eurasian Economic 
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is provided in Section II. Based on it, three theoretical schemes of financing an 
international union are outlined examined and further developed in Section III. Section 
IV discusses factors determining the choice of a scheme and then concludes.
II. Overview of Budgetary Revenues 
A. Eurasia
Among all international unions, the European Union (EU) is the most complicated 
in terms of mechanisms in its revenue-generation system. Article 311 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (former article 269 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community) states that the budget shall be financed wholly from own 
resources (EU 2008). This implies that own resources and other revenues comprise two 
groups of budgetary revenues for the EU. 
According to current legislation, the EU own resources are constituted (EU 2007) 
as:
(1) Common Customs Tariff duties and other duties established or to be established 
by the institutions of the Communities 
(2) the application of a uniform rate3 valid for all member-states to the harmonized 
Value Added Tax (VAT) assessment bases according to Community rules. The 
assessment base is taken into account for this purpose shall not exceed 50% of 
GNI for each member-state;
(3) the application of a uniform rate4 to the sum of all the member-states’ Gross 
National Incomes (GNIs).
Community (EurAsEC), the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (CUBKR), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Union of South American Nations (from Sp. UNASUR), the 
Andean Community (CAN), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).
3 For 2011, this uniform rate was established at 0.3%.
4 For 2011, this rate was calculated to be 0.7538236%.
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The first source of own resources is usually referred to as Traditional Own 
Resources (TOR) since they have been established since the creation of Customs Union 
in 1968. The second and the third are called VAT own resource and GNI own resource, 
correspondingly. GNI resource is also called residual resource because it finances part 
of budgetary revenues that is not covered by all other revenues. For many years, the 
latter makes up the majority of financial resources of the EU.5 
Besides these three sources of revenue, a bunch of other related mechanisms are 
considered. They include common rules to calculate harmonized VAT bases and 
GNIs of the member-states, mechanisms limiting own resources that can be charged to 
member-states. 
The rest of the EU budgetary revenues comprise surplus available from the preceding 
financial year, correction and adjustment contributions and refunds in connection with 
EU agreements and programs, interests on late payments and fines and revenue from 
borrowing and lending operations.
Since its early times, the EU underwent significant transformations for its revenue-
generating rules and procedures. During 1958~1983, direct contributions from 
members’ national budgets were an important revenue source for the EU budget. 
The customs duties were introduced as a revenue source in 1968; VAT resource was 
established since 1978; and GDP resource became effective in 1988 (Pietras 2008, 
p. 16). During late 1970s and in 1980s some other elements were introduced in the 
revenue-generating system of the EU, in particular, corrections in the form of reductions 
in contributions in favour of some member-states.
Most of international unions in Eurasia are financed through direct member-states’ 
contributions from their national budgets, according to politically agreed and legally 
binding rules. For instance, in the Central European Free trade Agreement (CEFTA) 
the contribution quotas are approved by the CEFTA Joint Committee every three years, 
taking into account economic capacity of member-states. According to the Decision No. 
7/2007, Croatia and Serbia each covered 25% of the common budget costs, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 12.5%, Macedonia 11%, Albania 8%, Montenegro and the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 6.5% each and Moldova  5.5% (CEFTA 
2007). Significant part of the CEFTA budget is made up by the EU donation. 
5 In 2011, share of GNI resource in total own resources was 75.6%. At the same time TOR and VAT resource constituted 13.4% 
and 11.0%, correspondingly.
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Contributions of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member-states to 
the common budget in the financial year 2013 were as follows: Iceland covered 3.07% 
of the budgetary needs, Lichtenstein 0.93%, Norway 55.85%, and Switzerland 40.15% 
(EFTA 2013). These shares are determined proportionally to member-states’ shares in 
total EFTA GDP. Macroeconomic indicators are averaged for the last three years to 
even out short period fluctuations. These shares are then weighted by a political factor 
related to the fact that Switzerland is non-participant in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) Agreement. Since significant part of the EFTA Secretariat expenses goes to the 
EEA related activities, this country is granted a rebate as for its contribution which is 
redistributed among other members.6 
Other (non-contribution) EFTA budgetary revenues are made up by surplus from 
previous financial year, write-offs, interest income, realised and unrealised exchange 
rate differences and bank charges (EFTA 2012). If a member-state is in arrears with 
the payment of its contributions, interest on arrears of 10 per cent per annum shall 
be charged, payable by the member-state together with the next contribution to the 
association (EFTA 2009).
As for the budgetary revenues in the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) 
and in the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (CUBKR) also  seem 
interesting. In these unions, administrative budgets are financed by member-states’ 
contributions that are calculated as shares in the common budget in proportion to 
the number of votes each member has in permanent authorizing bodies of the unions 
(Commission for the CUBKR and Integration Committee for the The Eurasian 
Economic Community EurAsEC).7 As for recent years in the EurAsEC, these shares 
were established at 15% each for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 40% for Russia 
and 7.5% each for Kyrgyzstan and Tadzhikistan.8 In the CUBKR they were 21.5% 
for each of Belarus and Kazakhstan and 57% for Russian Federation.9 Since 2011 in 
CUBKR, the contributions were made proportional to each member’s share in total 
amount of import duties. Today, Belarus is responsible for 4.7% of the CUBKR 
budgetary resources, Kazakhstan’s share is 7.33% and the Russian Federation’s share 
6 Information provided on the 25 of January 2013 by Tore Grønningsæter – EFTA Senior Information and Communication Officer.
7 It must be noted that this approach is not new. It is used by IMF for many years.
8 See article 15 of the Treaty Establishing Eurasian Economic Community (with corrections and amendments of 25 January 2006 and of 
6 October 2007) (EurAsEC 2000).
9 See article 7 of the Treaty about Commission of the Customs Union of 6 October 2007 (CUBKR 2007).
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makes 87.97%.10  
Contributions to finance common non-administrative programs and activities are 
subjected to separate decisions by the Interstate Council which is the supreme body of 
the EurAsEC. These decisions must be based on the degree of participation from the 
parties.11 
All expenses of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are equally distributed among 
its member-states.12 The same revenue-generating principle is applied in the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).13 
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) is a project of the Social and Economic 
Council of the Arab League. Its administrative and financial provisions are carried by 
member states of the Arab League. 
In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), different bodies 
and programs are budgeted according to different schemes that are subject of separate 
political decisions of the SAARC member-states. However, there rarely is a single 
rule and often special arrangements are applied to certain members. Administrative 
expenditures of the SAARC Secretariat, for example, are financed according to agreed 
scale of national contributions but the initial cost of construction of the main building 
of the Secretariat had to be met by the host government of Nepal. Similar principles are 
applied to financing of other SAARC bodies and their regional subdivisions. In case 
of transnational activities, the local expenses including hospitality, are borne by the 
host government within agreed limits while the cost of air travel is met by the sending 
government (International Labour Office 2013). 
Program expenditures are financed via national contributions and other resources. 
For instance, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF)14 is made up with callable and 
paid-up member-states’ contributions and other revenues from borrowings, loan 
repayments, commission on guarantees, income derived from loans made. 
10 See article 5 of the Treaty about establishment and application in the Customs Union of the order of distribution of import 
duties of 20 May 2010 (http://tsouz.ru/MGS/mgs21-05-10/Pages/Sogl_o_mexanizme_zachisl_poshlin.aspx). 
11 See article 15 of the Treaty Establishing Eurasian Economic Community.
12 See article 18 of the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC 1981).
13 See article 30 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Charter (ASEAN 2007). 
14 Its initial authorised capital is SDR 1 billion (approx. 1.5 billion US dollars). See article 3 of the Charter of the SAARC 
Development Fund (SDF) (SAARC 2008). 
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B. America
In the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), budgets of permanent authorities 
are financed by equal contributions from all member-states.15 At the same time, 
financial resources for special funds and programs are generated through different 
contributions of the member-states that take part in corresponding programs.16  
Contributions from national budgets are the main revenue source for budgets of the 
Andean Community (CAN) institutions like General Secretariat, and Court of Justice.17 
Initially, budgetary revenues in the Central American Integration System (SICA)18 
comprised by national contributions that is calculated in proportion to dues that 
member-states pay in accordance to their UN financial obligations.19 Later the rules 
of  contributions changed and after the Tegucigalpa Protocol administrative came into 
force, budgets of the SICA are financed equally by all the member-states.20 
Activities of the structures of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
are financed by the member-states. First of all, it concerns regional sections of the 
NAFTA Secretariat (NAFTA 2013). 
Revenues of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) budget are 
divided into two categories: core and donor revenues. Core revenues are made up 
primarily by contributions that member-states pay from their national budgets according 
to the rule: all six independent states pay 16% each of necessary resources and the 
rest is equally distributed among three non-independent countries (OECS 2008). First 
category also includes revenues received from activities of the OECS bodies.21 Donor 
revenues comprise aid from the third parties of states and international organizations. 
The latter revenue source plays very important role for the OECS.22 
Financial provisions of the OECS primary legislation do not allow unbalanced 
15 For example, budget of the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat in financial year 2013 was established at 4.208 million US 
dollars; each member-state paying 841.5 thousand US dollars (MERCOSUR 2012). 
16 For instance, budget of the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund is annually increased per 100 million US dollars, out of 
which Brazil pays 70%, Argentina 27%, Uruguay 2%, Paraguay 1%. Additionally the Fund is financed by unutilized costs, surpluses 
from preceding years, voluntary additional contributions of member-states etc. Its budget in 2011 totalled to 682.131 million US dollars 
(MERCOSUR 2010).
17 See article 22 of the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (CAN 1969).
18 Initially the name of the organization was Organization of Central American States (ODECA).
19 See article 3 of the Charter of Organization of Central American States (SICA 1962).
20 See article 32 of Tegucigalpa Protocol of the Charter of the Organization of the Central American States (SICA 1991). 
21 In particular, the Pharmaceutical Procurement Services (PPS) and the Eastern Caribbean Liaison Services Office (ECLS).
22 For instance, in the budget of the OECS Annual Work Programme for financial year 2012~2013 totalling to 81.6 million EC 
dollars (approx. 30 million US dollars), donor aid accounted for 77% (OECS 2012).
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budget.23 
The financing of the ordinary budget for the General Secretariat of the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR) is based on contribution of the member-states 
to be determined by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, taking into account 
economic capacity of the member-states, shared responsibility, and principle of equity.24 
Member-states’ budgetary contributions in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
is based on the capacity to pay (CARICOM 2006). GDP is used as an indicator for 
capacity to pay. 
C. Africa
The regular budgets of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and its institutions are funded from a community levy and other sources determined by 
the ECOWAS Council. The community levy is a percentage share of the total value 
of import duty derivable from goods imported into the Community from the third 
countries. The percentage rate is regularly corrected by the Council, taking into account 
the financial needs of the ECOWAS. Special budgets can be made available when 
necessary.25 
Part of the revenue received by member-states from common customs tariff and 
indirect taxes constitutes own resources of the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU). This budgetary resource is called Community Solidarity Levy. 
Rates of transfers are decided annually, taking into account budgetary expenditures and 
revenues. The WAEMU budget must be in balance. In due course of time, it is planned 
to establish the Union VAT that will replace part of national indirect taxes.26 Loans, 
grants and external financial aids can also constitute the WAEMU budgetary revenues 
if they do not contradict the goals of the organization.27 
Principle of financial solidarity applied in the WAEMU is a unique feature of this 
organization’s budgetary system. It means that when discussing budgetary issues, 
23 See article 17 of the Treaty of Basseterre Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Economic Union (OECS 
2010).
24 See article 16 of the South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty (UNASUR 2008).
25 See articles 70–73 of the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS 1993).
26 See articles 47, 54 and 55 of the Treaty of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU 1994).
27 In the 2013, WAEMU budget, totalling to CFA francs 106.608 billion (approx. 162.5 million euro), Community Solidarity Levy 
accounted for 68.4%; the rest fell on other resources. 
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member-states are not allowed to refer to equivalence between their budgetary 
contribution and benefits that they receive from membership in the union as an 
argument.28 
Similar scheme, except for solidarity principle, underlies revenue-generating in the 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Its own resources 
are made up by the Community Integration Levy,29 which is a part of the Community 
Common Customs Tariff. Together with other possible revenues (income from 
activities of the CEMAC institutions; levy on each member-state’s share of distributed 
profits of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC); external aid) the Levy finances 
two types of budgets: administrative budgets of the CEMAC institutions and the budget 
of the Community Development Fund. 
According to article 50 of the Revised Treaty of Economic and Monetary Community 
of Central Africa administrative budgets of the CEMAC institutions and bodies are 
financed on the basis of equality.30 The Community Integration Levy is the main source 
of these financial resources. In case when the Levy does not provide with necessary 
amount, residual must be paid as direct transfer from national budget. 
The budget of the Community Development Fund comprises leftovers from the 
Levy and 20% of the BEAC distributed profits (CEMAC 2011b).
Collection and transfer of the Community Integration Levy is an exclusive 
competence of the member-states’ customs bodies (CEMAC 2000). Members that are 
in arrears with their payments can be deprived of the voting rights in all bodies of the 
CEMAC and ceased to enjoy the benefits of the common economic area provided by 
the CEMAC legislation. Organization’s budgets must be in balance.31 
Common Revenue Pool makes the main source of budgetary revenues in the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). It comprises all customs, excise and additional 
duties collected in the Common Customs Area during each financial year. However, 
only small part of these duties is directed to finance activities of the SACU itself, called 
operational budget.32 The rest of the money is distributed among the member-states 
28 See article 49 of the Treaty of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU 1994).
29 Since 2002 its rate is 1% of value of all imported to CEMAC goods (CEMAC 2000). 
30 For instance, total budget of the CEMAC institutions and agencies in financial year 2012 was equal to CFA francs 25.304 billion 
(approx. 38.6 million euro). This amount was financed by each of 6 CEMAC member-states in equal shares (CFA francs 4.217 billion) 
(CEMAC 2011a).
31 See articles 49 and 52 of the Revised Treaty of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC 2008).
32 In 2011~2012 financial year (1 April~31 March) operational budget of the organization was 43.181 million rands (approx. 4.3 
million euros), 94 % of which came from the Common Revenue Pool and the rest were made up by other revenues (SACU 2013).
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according to rather complicated formula (Kirk 2003) after the operational budget has 
been approved.
The SACU member-states have to carry out appropriate payments to the Common 
Revenue Pool during the second quarter of each financial year. The amount are 
estimated based on forecasted values of the duties.33 
Administrative and program expenditures in the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) are financed in different ways. Administrative budgets are 
for permanent bodies of the organization, the Secretariat and Court of the COMESA. 
They are financed through differentiated member-states’ contributions that are decided 
by the COMESA Council, taking into account the estimated expenditures and resources 
available from other sources of grants, donations, income of the COMESA institutions. 
Contributions which are calculated according to the formula must be similar for both 
bodies and be reconsidered regularly.34 
Program expenditures are directly related to the formation of the common market. 
They have to be covered by special duty called the Common Market Levy.35 
Annual budgets of the East African Community (EAC) are made up of equal 
contributions from member-states’ national budgets. They can be complemented by 
regional and international grants, donations, technical assistance, revenue generated by 
the Community itself and its bodies.36  
Member-states’ budgetary contributions in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) are on the basis of their GDP levels. The growth rate of annual 
national contributions cannot exceed annual GDP’s average growth rate in the Community 
(SADC 2009). It should be noted that SADC, similar to other international unions of 
developing countries, shows significant dependence on external revenue sources.37 
33 See articles 32 and 35 of the 2002 Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACU 2002).
34 See articles 42 and 166 of the Agreement Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA 1993).
35 See article 168 of the Agreement Establishing the COMESA (COMESA 1993). I wasn’t able to find more detailed information on 
mechanism of generation of this revenue. 
36 See articles 132–133 of the East African Community Treaty (EAC 1999).
37 Of 39.36 million US dollars budget in financial year 2007~2008 41.1% were made up by grants from international organizations 
and developed countries (such as African Development Bank, European Union, World Bank, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa 
(FARA), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Organization, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and others) (SADC 2009).
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III. Financing Schemes 
Section II provided empirical evidence that there are three schemes for revenue-
generating in international unions: (i) member-states pay that is determined  by direct 
contributions from national budgets (contributions scheme); (ii) direct supranational 
taxes are introduced (direct taxes scheme) and (iii) mixed scheme that combines elements 
of the two. One should note that in most cases, the simplest unions do not create 
supranational budgets. Their activities are financed from national budgets of the parties 
that undertake these activities or host the events. 
All current international unions with constituted budgets more or less fit in this 
classification. Most of them are financed via contributions and only some generate their 
revenues through taxes or the combination of both (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Revenue-generating Schemes of International Unions
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The direct taxes scheme and the mixed scheme are commonly practiced in either 
rather advanced (EU, WAUMU, CEMAC) or rather ambitious in terms of pursued 
goals (COMESA, SACU, ECOWAS) unions. It can be explained by the popular 
understanding that application of direct supranational taxes for revenue-generating 
purposes in international unions ensures higher financial sustainability of the unions 
themselves. However, as it is argued in Boiar (2013) that revenue source is not the 
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major factor of financial stabilization in international unions. The facts that problems 
of late, erroneous or failed payments are proper to organizations financed by different 
schemes confirm this hypothesis. 
A. Contributions 
Under contributions scheme, an international union’s budget is financed according 
to formula: 
  Y = a + ( )i
n
1i
i xy∑
=  
i xi                                                   (1)
where Y represents planned level of expenditures and, correspondingly, revenues; 
a represents other (non-contribution) budgetary revenues; n represents number of 
member-states in a union; xi represent percentage share of state i in total budgetary 
contributions (that is ( )∑
=
n
1i
ix i = 100 %); yi xi – size of budgetary contribution of state i 
calculated according to expression yi= 
xi 
100 × (Y −a).
Figure 2 gives general demonstration of the contributions scheme for international 
union of three member-states. 
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Figure 2. Budgetary contributions 
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Denoted under a, non-contribution revenues can include fines for violation of 
the union legislation, surpluses available from the preceding financial years, income 
received from services provided by the administrative bodies, taxes paid by the union 
employees, donations from the third parties of individuals, legal entities, states or 
international organizations, borrowings etc. 
There is no common rule on how to determine percentage shares of separate 
member-states in total budgetary contributions xi . Different principles can underlie 
them. In general, three main approaches can be singled out with respect to this issue: (i) 
contributions are manually agreed by politicians without clear underlying rule (political 
trade-off)38; (ii) contributions are linked to some institutional parameter (usually the 
number of votes each country has in main decision-making bodies of the union)39; (iii) 
38 They are decided to be in equal shares in ASEAN, GCC, EAC, SICA and MERCOSUR fixed at agreed levels and reconsidered 
regularly in CEFTA and UNASUR, etc.
39 As it is in EurAsEC and as it was in CUBKR.
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contributions are linked to some macroeconomic indicators like GDP40, GNI41 or a base 
for some tax42 during a particular period of time.43  
Under the first two approaches, contributions are legally fixed as stable percentage 
shares in the union’s budget. These shares usually stay unchanged for many years44 and 
their absolute monetary sizes depend only on the amount of total expenditures decided. 
Under the third approach, member-states’ percentage shares in the union’s budget 
change every financial year following changes in total expenditures and in basic 
macroeconomic variables. In this case, legislator determines and approves a percentage 
share, X that each member-state pays as its contribution to the common budget as, 
                                               X =  ∑
=
−
n
1i
MACRO
aY
          (2)
i           
(2)
where Y represents budget size in the planned financial year; a represents other (non-
contribution) budgetary revenues; n represents number of member-states in a union; 
MACROi represents value of basic macroeconomic parameter of state i in basic period. 
Upper or lower limits on revenues45 or on their growth rates46 can be established in 
revenue-generating schemes of such kind. Member-states carry their contributions as 
direct transfers from national budget according to the union legislative act. In some cases, 
it can be reasonable to link budgetary contributions to such macroeconomic variables as 
intra-union turnover or export in primarily trade liberalization blocks, national gold, and 
foreign currency reserve for unions whose main goal is macroeconomic stabilization in 
the region, or for the unions that carry common commercial policy.
One of the main advantages of the contributions scheme is that it is relatively simple 
and easy to understand for wide population of the public. Additionally, contributions 
scheme significantly reduces the risks of unbalanced budget since macroeconomic 
40 As in EFTA, CARICOM, SADC and some others.
41 As in EU.
42 Part of national budgetary contributions in EU is linked to Value Added Tax (VAT) base.
43 It can be forecasted values of the basic parameter for the planned financial year (as in EU), actual three-year averages for 
preceding financial years (EFTA), etc.
44 Unless some significant institutional arrangements are undertaken in the union (enlargement, institutional or legislative reforms etc.).
45 It is the EU case, where maximum amount of own resources generated is limited at 1.23% of the EU GNI.
46 As in SADC and EU.
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situation is considered as the second order factor. Budget deficit or surplus can occur in 
the case when parameter a (non-contribution revenues) is miscalculated or when some 
members fail to carry out their financial obligations. To avoid such problems, union 
legislation should allow technical budgetary corrections and impose sanctions for states 
that violate their budgetary responsibilities. 
On the other hand, contributions scheme creates direct financial dependence of 
the union upon political will of its member-states. It is the main shortcoming of this 
scheme.
B. Direct taxes 
Under direct taxes scheme, it does not necessarily mean the creation of special 
supranational tax administration. Tax authorities of member-states are responsible for 
collecting and transferring such resources. Budgetary planning in this case is revenue-
based, that is expenditures are directly limited by the amount of expected tax revenues. 
In the case when only one supranational tax is introduced or other taxes are steady 
in time, captured with a parameter, budgetary function can be described by the linear 
equation:     
 
Y = a + b × X                                                          (3)
where Y is planned level of revenues; a represents other budgetary revenues; b 
represents tax rate; X represents expected size of the tax base in a particular financial 
year in all member-states. Graphically this dependence is demonstrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Direct supranational tax
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Budgetary balance is directly affected by the macroeconomic volatility in member-
states. In Figure 3, values X′ and X′′ reflect real sizes of the tax base in some financial 
years while X is its expected size that cause deficit (Y – Y′) and surplus (Y′′– Y ), 
correspondingly. 
For simplicity, in this model it is assumed that tax base is aggregate, meaning it 
embraces corresponding tax bases of all the union member-states. In practice, however, 
there is a need to separate tax bases in every member-state since tax collection is 
carried out by separate national authorities and there should be a mechanism to control 
execution of budgetary responsibilities by member-states. 
If an international union’s budget is financed by a few supranational taxes, Equation 
(3) will be rewritten as follows: 
  
    
                                          
XbaY (           )
k
1j
jj∑
=
×+=  
 
                                         (4)
    
where k represents a number of supranational taxes; bj represents tax rate for tax j; Xj 
represents an expected size of aggregate tax base for tax j.
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Splitting the tax base by member-states (under single tax rate in all the states) will 
transform the Equation (4) into, 
                                                                                   
XbaY (                 )
k
1j
n
1i
jij∑ ∑
= =
×+=  
 
     (5)
where n represents a number of international union member-states and Xji represents 
an expected tax base for tax j in member-state i.
Each national tax administration is obliged to forward tax revenue assigned to 
the union’s budget until depletion of its national quota. To establish these quotas, the 
same approaches can be used as in case of calculation of contributions presented in the 
subsection III-A.
An advantage of the direct taxes scheme is its ability to provide more automatic 
financing of the union’s budget and to decrease financial dependence of the union from 
internal political factors.47 Establishment of supranational taxes as a source of revenue 
of an international union’s budget can also increase political and financial responsibility 
of the union officials and institutions to the public. Therefore, it makes more sense to 
impose the implementation of policies on the union bodies. For example, (1) customs 
policy – import duties (2) tax harmonization – indirect taxes (3) free movement of 
capital – taxes from financial transactions (4) competition policy – fines paid for 
infringement of the union competition law.
From the theory of fiscal federalism's point of view, transfer to supranational bodies 
whose tax bases are significantly spatially diverse, will increase efficiency of tax and 
fiscal policies (Fiscal federalism 1997). Import duties, excise-duties, value added tax, 
financial transactions tax are some examples of such taxes.48 
Higher risk of budget deficit and relative complexity are the main shortcomings of 
the direct tax scheme compared to contributions model. 
Creation of a tax union should be considered as the culmination of the direct taxes 
scheme. It will lead to the establishment of supranational tax authorities and full or 
significant loss of sovereignty of the union member-states as for tax policy. If this is 
47 In some international unions (EU, WAEMU, CEMAC) principle of automatic (independent) financing is reflected in the concept of 
own resources.
48 As it was mentioned in Section II import duties are a source of revenue for EU, SACU, CEMAC, WAEMU, ECOWAS and 
COMESA; excise-duties – for SACU and WAEMU. Financial transactions tax and traditional VAT (part of it) are planned to be established 
in EU until the end of current decade. 
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the case, financing of an international union’s budget would have large similarity to 
budgeting in federal states. So far, there were no precedents of tax unions in the modern 
history of economic integration.
C. Mixed scheme
In mixed financing scheme, advantages of both contributions and direct taxes 
schemes can be combined. For example, some supranational taxes can be introduced 
to provide an international union with own financial resources. Together with other 
non-tax and non-contributing revenues, they will ensure significant part of the union’s 
budgetary revenues. The rest of financial resources needed to cover expenditures should 
be obtained through contributions scheme. This will make contributions a residual 
resource and minimize the risks of budget deficit to occur.49 
Combining contributions and taxes makes revenue-generating scheme complicated 
and opaque which is the main disadvantage of the mixed scheme.
 
IV. Selection of Revenue-Generating Scheme 
Intentionally, optimal revenue-generating scheme for international unions is 
not specified in this study. This would be inappropriate since the scheme has to be 
adapted according to each union’s unique legal, political, institutional, economic 
and sociocultural setting. Thus, determinants that underlie the choice of the revenue-
generating scheme is the last important issue to be discussed here. 
There are several groups of such determinants. First of all, it is financial needs of 
an international union or, to be more specific, its budget size. If the needs are relatively 
small, the question to which revenue-generating scheme to choose is of little principle. 
Member-states can easily agree to finance common budget with equal shares by simple 
contributions from national budgets. If, however, the union is expected to dispose large 
49 In EU these contributions are calculated proportionally to member-states’ shares in the EU GNI (GNI resource – Section II). 
Equation (2) is used for this purpose. Some prototype of a mixed scheme is also proper to COMESA. There are intentions to establish 
mixed scheme of revenue-generating in CARICOM (CARICOM 2006).
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financial resources, more diverse revenue sources could be more preferable. A question 
of fair formula as for distribution of budgetary liabilities among member-states can 
sharply arise.
Secondly, the form of integration and its objectives matter. Higher level of integration 
(economic and/or monetary union, common market) can afford more diverse financing 
schemes (contributions linked to various macroeconomic parameters, variety of 
supranational taxes, fines etc.) since the authorities have more powers. At the same 
time, customs unions can only rely on import duties and contributions. For FTA, 
contributions seem to be the only option.
Political, economic, sociocultural, historical, geographical peculiarities of the 
parties make the third group of determinants. General rule here is as follows: with 
more heterogenous member states, financing schemes should allow more differentiated 
budgetary payments by its member-states. If international union is created closely with 
all these terms, nations can gain larger and more diverse revenues. On the contrary 
simple, transparent, and fair revenue-generating rules can be adapted by member-states 
and their public.
Success of integration project is also an important factor. If citizens of member-
states feel improvements in their work and life conditions that are due to successful 
fulfillment of international union’s projects, the enhancement of the union revenue-
generating system can be undertaken.
Based on these observations, it can be expected that financing schemes will become 
more and more complicated as international unions advance and need larger financial 
resources. Simple contributions schemes will be supplemented with supranational 
taxation elements transforming, thus, into mixed schemes. Additional evidence that 
the mixed schemes will become more popular in the future is found in the fact that in 
this revenue-generating model, advantages of extreme polar cases can be successfully 
combined. The EU experience confirms it as well.
In most cases, the type of revenue-generating scheme chosen by an international 
union plays minor role for political and financial stability of the union. What is more 
important is if the whole budgetary system (revenues and expenditures together) is 
perceived by the parties as fair. The best way to ensure the fairness is to make members’ 
budgetary payments proportionate to the utility that the states receive from integration. 
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